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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze the extent to which Tunisian firms regard
corruption as a major obstacle to their product and process innovation. Using
firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in 2013, we
empirically test how innovation accentuates or mitigates the corruption obstacle.
We show that innovation has a negative and statistically significant effect on the
corruption obstacle. Besides, we prove that competition and the obstacle to cor-
ruption are negatively related. This result teaches that the Tunisian firms face a
rent-shifting corruption.
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1 Introduction
Several theoretical and empirical studies have been carried on innovation. Some
frameworks focused on the relationship between innovation and economic performance
(Cre´pon et al., 1998; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2003; Roper and Dundas, 1998; Cainelli et
al., 2006; Mansury et al. 2008). Other works analyzed the determinants of innovation
and the role of external linkages while introducing external control factors such as size
and age of the firm (Duguet, 2006; Raymond and St-Pierre, 2010). Innovation has also
been the topic of some Tunisian papers. Indeed, Kriaa and Karray (2010) analyzed
the link between R&D investment and innovation of Tunisian firms. They showed that
firms invest in R&D not only to innovate but also to improve their ability to assimi-
late and exploit the existing technological knowledge. Furthermore, innovation can be
influenced by other relevant features. For instance, Sdiri and Ayadi (2014) show that
internationalization increases firms’ innovation profitability. This result may embody
the fact that the access to external knowledge can determine the innovation perfor-
mance of service firms.
Despite the abundance of literature on innovation, the analysis of the relationships
between innovation and corruption remains a major and noteworthy issue. Empiri-
cal studies on this relationship are rather limited for developing countries, Tunisia, in
particular. Therefore, it is necessary to empirically investigate the hypothesis that cor-
ruption can hamper Tunisian firms’ innovation.
The definition of corruption is ambiguous. Some scholars regard it as a good con-
tributor to the economic growth and performance (Leff, 1964). Other scholars link
corruption to the worst way by which political and public decision makers govern the
country’s affairs; corruption has then tendency to harm the well-being of nations. Un-
der a corrupted system, the wealth of the nation has been, typically, in the hand of a
limited number of corruptors who handle and manage institutions to their best interests.
Corruption has always been among the most important concepts that economists
and practitioners have debated for decades. The majority of them have been interested
in analyzing its causes and consequences. They have also provided some policy consid-
erations and solutions to this hidden and no-controllable practice. The major questions
they should address are: how to reduce and/or avoid corruption? What are the tools
to battle corruption? Does cooperation with the existing corruptors inhibit the advent
of other ones? The negative consequences of corruption can be perceived at the micro
and macro levels. At the micro-level, corruption contributes to reduce firms’ competi-
tiveness and limit their market power. For instance, Alexeev and Song (2013) evaluate
the impact of corruption on the product market competition. Corruption strengthens
also the informal economy that, in turn, undermines the public-private relationships.
At the macro-level, corruption is a factor of economic recession. It decreases the GDP
per-capita (exogenous economic growth), lowers the economic development (endoge-
nous economic growth), intensifies social instability, implies higher unemployment and
inflation rates, etc. Corruption may also inhibit the foreign direct investors. Castro and
Nunes (2013) studied corruption impact on FDI inflows. They showed that countries
with lower corruption benefitted from greater FDI entries.
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In spite of the fact that public and private decision-makers have always tended to
mitigate the corruption magnitude via undertaking innovation investments, corruption
remains an obstacle and/or a big problem for them. Actually, the corruption obstacle-
innovation relationship is a new topic. Wong (2015) has investigated the extent to
which innovation alters the growing shape of corruption. He shows that when a firm
decides to innovate, it considers corruption as a major obstacle to innovation decision.
It is well-observed that the intensity of corruption is sufficiently large in the develop-
ing and/or emerging countries. This is linked to the weak social, economic and political
infrastructures in these countries. For instance, according to the enterprise survey real-
ized by the World Bank in 2013, 54.78% of Egyptian companies identify corruption as a
major or serious problem; and 45.18% of Moroccan firms consider corruption as a severe
constraint. Tunisia suffers also from corruption. In 2015 and according to the Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Tunisia is ranked 76th among 168
countries and territories in terms of corruption 1. The Tunisian GDP decreases by 2%
because of corruption. Global Financial Integrity has assessed that Tunisia has lost 1.2
billion dollars every year between 2000 and 2008. This is caused by bribes, subordina-
tion and falsification of the criminal activities. 2 This corruption is notably related to
the corrupted political systems that have governed Tunisia before the 2011-revolution
and during the democratic transition. The economic infrastructures and the education
systems are deteriorated. Furthermore, the wealth distribution is distinctly oriented
to the coastal regions where resident and foreign capitalists are willing to invest. It is
also important to mention that corruption has attracted corrupt foreign investors who
cooperate with the resident ones.
Corruption is a major obstacle to the Tunisian business firms’ activities, including
innovation. Tunisian companies continue to increase their R&D to lower their marginal
production costs (achieving economies of scale) and therefore they could capture more
competitive advantages in the final market (market power). These companies also pro-
vide more efforts in order to improve the quality of their products and thus increase
the range of the varieties on the market. Thus, they see corruption as a constraint
that could hamper the activities related to innovation. This constraint could be either
enhanced or attenuated by investments in innovation.
The scope of this paper is then to analyze the extent to which Tunisian firms regard
corruption as a major obstacle to their innovative activities. In other words, we exam-
ine how undertaking innovation accentuates or mitigates the corruption obstacle. We
distinguish between product and process innovation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review on
the relationship between innovation and corruption. Section 3 contains a description
of the data set and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 sets out the
econometric model. Section 5 analyzes the main results. Section 6 is a conclusion.
1. For more details, see http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
2. World Bank (2014): “The unfinished revolution : bringing opportunity, good jobs and greater
wealth to all Tunisians”. Rapport No 86179-TN, p117
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2 Innovation and corruption: literature review
In this section, we present the main works that concentrated on corruption. The lat-
ter is ascribed numerous definitions. For instance, Transparency International defines
it as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty
and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs”. 3
The World Bank regards it as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social de-
velopment. It undermines development by distorting the role of law and weakening the
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends”. Corruption has several
forms, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, falsification and informal practices.
Even if corruption is not a new phenomenon, it has taken a wide attention from the
academic research during the last decade. Some studies discussed the relationship be-
tween corruption and economic growth. The results of these studies were divergent. For
instance, Mauro (1995) and Wei (2000) showed that corruption constitutes an obstacle
for the economy because it hampers the economic growth. However, Barreto (2001) de-
termined a positive relationship between corruption and GDP per capita growth. Lau
et al. (2015) indicated that corruption greases the wheels of economic growth of coun-
tries in the European and Central Asia (ECA). Other frameworks analyzed the effect of
corruption on the Foreign Direct Investment. Castro and Nunes (2013) investigated the
impact of corruption on FDI inflows. Using 73 countries during the period 1998-2008,
they suggested that the FDI inflows are greater in countries where corruption is lower.
They also noted that corruption control can be an important strategy to enhance the
FDI inflows. In addition, some other scholars such as Alexeev and Song (2010) ana-
lyzed the correlation between competition and corruption. They deduced that fierce
competition is associated with higher corruption.
According to the above literature, it is argued that corruption, whatever its forms,
has harmful effects on business operations. For instance, it reduces employment, hinders
the entry of FDI, reduces firms’ competitiveness and creates inequality. But what about
the relationship between innovation and corruption? Indeed, many empirical studies
have analyzed this relationship. Lau et al. (2015) analyzed the determinants of product
innovations. They proved that corruption promotes innovative capabilities of countries
in ECA region. Using World Bank Enterprise Survey on Indian firms, Waldemar (2012)
tested the impact of corruption, measured as a bribes tax, on product innovation. He
found that corruption reduces the probability to innovate. Mahagaonkar (2010) as-
certained that corruption has a positive effect on marketing innovation and a negative
effect on product innovation and organization innovation. Nguyen and Jaramillo (2014)
argued that the firms’ return on innovation is lower in countries with low level of institu-
tional quality. They explained this result by the fact that bad institutional environments
discourage firms to innovate. In the same context, Wong (2015) was interested in ana-
lyzing the incidence of corruption on innovation decision. This author concluded that
corruption is a bigger obstacle when a firm decides to enter the innovation process.
3. For more details, see https://www.transparency.org.
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3 Data and variables measure
3.1 Data
To test how innovation fosters the corruption obstacle, we used the enterprise survey
data carried out by the World Bank in 2013. This data base is carried on firm-level
using a representative sample of the manufacturing and service firms. The World Bank
Enterprise Survey (hereafter WBES) data are collected through a stratified random
sampling by using the industry, region of establishment location and establishment
size. 4 Indeed, the survey covers small (5 to 19 employees), medium (20 to 99 employ-
ees) and large (more than 99 employees) firms from manufacturing (food, garments,
and other manufacturing) and services sectors (retail and other services) located in five
Tunisian regions (Tunis, Sfax, Northeast, South Coast/West and Interior). 5
The questionnaire used for the survey offers a wide range of data. Apart from general
information on the firm’s characteristics, the questionnaire includes several sections such
as access to finance, competition, capacity, labor, performance, corruption, innovation
and the business environment. The dataset consists of 592 Tunisian enterprises. In
this paper, we have dropped the missing responses as well as the “Don’t know ” and
“Does Not” responses from the dataset. This has led to cross section data of 2013 that
included only 536 firms in Tunisia.
3.2 Variables measure
Corruption Obstacle Prior empirical studies have used different indicators in order
to measure corruption. Ades and Ditella (1999) measured corruption by subjective
indicators that are related to the whole country. Barasa et al. (2014) adopted a
composite measure of firm-level perceptions of governance of the institutional quality
at the regional level. This measure is constructed by using factor analysis so as to
synthesize information about the perceptions of corruption, rules of law and regulatory
quality. In this paper, we rely on a measure adopted by Wong (2015). This variable
is the answer to the question: To what degree is corruption an obstacle to the current
operations of this establishment? The answers to this question are ordered according
to a 5-point scale ranging from 0 to 4: (0) No Obstacle, (1) a Minor Obstacle, (2) a
Moderate obstacle, (3) a Major Obstacle, or (4) a Very Severe Obstacle.
Innovation The majority of the previous studies that have focused on the innovation
topic measured innovation by the number of patents or the percentage of new product
sales (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2003). In this paper, we use two indicators of innovation.
The first one is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment has introduced new or
significantly improved products or services and 0 otherwise. The second one is another
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has introduced any new or significantly
4. For more details, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/
5. Northeast (Ariana, Ben Arous, Bizerte, Manouba, and Nabeul), South Coast/West (Sousse,
Monastir, Mahdia, Gabes, Medenine) and the Interior (Beja, Gafsa, Jendouba, Kairouan, Kasserine,
Kebili, Kef, Sidi Bouzid, Siliana, Tataouine, and Tozeur)
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improved methods of manufacturing products or services and 0 otherwise. These two
measures are in accordance with prior research (Wong, 2015 and Barasa et al. 2014).
Firm size The relationship between innovation and firm size has been largely exam-
ined in several previous works. Wong (2015) measured the size of the firm using an
ordinal variable equal to 1 if the firm is small (with less than 20 employees), equal to 2
if the firm has a medium size (with 20 to 99 employees), and equal to 3 if the firm is
large (with 100 or more employees). Barasa et al. (2014) used a binary variable as mea-
sure of firm size. This variable takes the value 1 if the number of full-time permanent
employees is greater than 20 employees and 0 otherwise. Asiedu and Freeman (2009),
in turn, used two dummy variables to measure the firm size. The first variable, relative
to a small firm, takes 1 if the number of employees is less than 50 and 0 otherwise. The
second variable, corresponding to a medium firm, takes 1 if the number of employees is
greater than 50 but less than 500 and 0 otherwise. In this paper, we choose the total
annual sales for all products and services as a firm size measure. More precisely, the
respondents are asked to answer the following question: “In the 2012 fiscal year, what
were this establishment’s total annual sales for all products and services?”
Competition Competition is a dummy variable that measures competitive pressure.
It takes 1 if the number of competitors faced by the establishment is greater than 5 and
0 otherwise.
Finance We have introduced this variable in our model to know how the surveyed
firms fund their operations. We use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a line
of credit or a loan from a financial institution and 0 otherwise.
Exports In this paper, we use the information provided by the survey about the
percentage of the national establishment’s sales. We define exports as a continuous
variable that corresponds to the percentage of a firm’s sales outside the country.
Vintage of the firm The firm’s vintage is determined by the year when the estab-
lishment began its operations. More precisely, this measure indicates the number of
years during which the firm has been acting in the market until the survey year (2013).
Employee level of education TThe Enterprise Survey data provides information
on the level of education attained by employees. In this paper, we have adopted the
number of full-time employees holding a university or higher degree as a measure of the
education level attained by employees.
4 Model specification and estimation
We analyze the extent to which innovative companies regard corruption as a major
obstacle in comparison with those that do not innovate. Indeed, the responses to the
question about the different corruption obstacles are classified according to a 5-point
scale. The value 0 designates that corruption does not represent an obstacle for the
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development of the firm’s operations while the value 4 sets corruption as a very severe
obstacle. The ordered structure of the dependent variable corrup obst allows the use of
ordered discrete choice models. We use an ordered logit model. As the values taken by
the ordered multinomial variable corrup obst are grouped into intervals, we obtain only
one continuous unobservable latent variable corrup obst∗. This kind of model assumes
that the values are identical for all observations. Indeed, the level of corrup obst∗ is
parameterized by the threshold parameters cj , and a constant is therefore not introduced
in the linear model. This model is written as follows: 6
corrup obsti =


0 if corrup obst∗i < c1
1 if c1 ≤ corrup obst
∗
i < c2
2 if c2 ≤ corrupobst
∗
i < c3 ∀i = 1, ...536
3 if c3 ≤ corrup obst
∗
i < c4
4 if c4 ≤ corrup obst
∗
i < c5
(1)
The threshold parameters cj are in an ascending order (cj+1 ≥ cj) where the variable
corrup obst∗ is defined by:
corrup obst∗i = Xiβ + εi (2)
whereXi represents the vector of the explanatory variables and εi is a random error term
which is assumed to have a logistic distribution. The probabilities that corrup obsti
will take on each of the values 0 to 4 are equal to:
Pr(corrup obsti = 0) = Λ(c1 −Xiβ)
Pr(corrup obsti = 1) = Λ(c2 −Xiβ)− Λ(c1 −Xiβ)
... = ...
P r(corrup obsti = 4) = 1− Λ(xiβ)
where Λ(.) denotes the standard logistic cumulative distribution function.
The likelihood function of an observation i is:
L =
n∏
i=1
4∏
j=0
Pr(yi = j)
yij
=
n∏
i=1
4∏
j=0
[Λ(c5 −Xiβ)− Λ(c4 −Xiβ)]
yij
where yij is defined as:
yij =
{
1 if yi = j
0 otherwise
Parameters β and cj , j = 0, ...4 are estimated using the ordered logit model by
maximizing the log-likelihood function.
6. For further details, see Greene (2003).
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5 Empirical findings
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The Corruption Perceptions Index (hereafter CPI) ranks countries and territories
based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. The score 0 indicates that
the country is highly corrupt while the score 100 indicates that the country is very
clean. According to CPI 2015, Somalia and North Korea have got the lowest score
(the most corrupt countries) in the world rankings, while the least corrupt countries
are: Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand, Finland and Denmark. The latter received a
score of 91 allowing it to take the first place. The CPI shows that Morocco, Algeria
and Egypt are ranked 88th with a score of 36. Compared with these African countries,
Tunisia has lost 3 places in the ranking of corruption perceptions. Indeed, Tunisia was
ranked 76th out of 168 countries with a score of 38 points.
The Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies (hereafter TICQS)
and the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) are interested in the corruption topic.
According to TICQS in 2014, 42% of respondents adjudge that corruption has increased
compared to 2013 while 44% declare that corruption has kept the same magnitude 7.
Although most of the companies surveyed found that corruption still persisted, only
26% of these companies consider it to be a major or severe obstacle that impedes their
activities.
Summary statistics relating to our sample show that around 49% of companies in-
dicated that they have introduced at least one innovation. 8 25.75% of these companies
reported that they have introduced a product innovation during the last three years
before 2013 and 23.32% of them mentioned that they have introduced a process inno-
vation (See table 2 below).
Regarding the relationship between innovation and firm size, the 2012 Investment
Climate Assessment Survey (hereafter ICAS) demonstrates that 47% of Tunisian firms
have introduced an improved or a new product. According to this survey, large firms
report the highest level of innovation (55.8%). In contrast with ICAS, we show that
41.6% of innovative firms are medium-sized (having between 20 and 99 employees).
This rate is higher compared to the larger firms. We relate this result to the fact that
the medium enterprises are more incentivized to avoid the rude competition they face.
Thus, their aim would be to commit in R&D efforts in order to reduce their marginal
production costs. It would also be to capture additional market shares by improving
the quality of their products.
The WBES survey provides information on the firm’s business sectors. These sec-
tors are classified into five activities: (1) food, (2) garments, (3) other manufacturing,
(4) retail and (5) other services. Based on the data collected from this survey, we also
7. For more details, see the TICQS’s 2014- report.
8. A firm is regarded as innovative when declaring that it has introduced (during the last three years,
i.e. before the date of the survey) product innovation, process innovation, organizational innovation
and marketing innovation.
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explore the distribution of innovative companies by business sector. We show that the
largest number of innovative companies is located in the third sector (33.97%), followed
by companies operating in the fifth one (27.86%).
Firm location can also be a factor affecting the innovation decision. The survey de-
fined five regions: Tunis, Sfax, Northeast, South Coast/West and Interior. According
to the World Bank data, table 2 shows that the shares of innovative Tunisian companies
in different regions are very close. Indeed, statistics show that both Sfax and Northeast
have a large number of innovative companies (24.05%) followed by South Coast/West
(22.90%) and Tunis (20.23%) while the Interior region is very low on innovation (only
8.78%).
Table 1 shows that 16.35% of innovative firms regard corruption as a major obstacle
to the development of their operations. Also, it indicates that 14.82% of innovative
firms consider corruption as a very severe obstacle which obstructs their business ac-
tivities.
Table 1: Distribution of companies according to their corruption perceptions
Obstacle Corruption INN PROD INN PRO Total
No Yes No Yes
No obstacle 92 43 89 46 135
Minor obstacle 55 31 57 29 86
Moderate obstacle 96 18 100 14 114
Major obstacle 113 24 118 19 137
Very Severe Obstacle 42 22 47 17 64
Total 398 138 411 125 536
Source: Our own calculations based on the WBES.
9
Table 2: Distribution of innovative firms by size, location and industry
INNOVATION Product Innovation Process Innovation CORRUPTION
(262 firms) (138 firms) (125 firms) (201 firms)
N % N % N % N %
Size Small (>=5 and <=19) 81 30.92 41 29.71 32 25.6 78 38.81
Medium (>=20 and <=99) 109 41.6 64 46.38 61 48.8 89 44.28
Large (>=100) 72 27.48 33 23.91 32 25.6 34 16.92
Industry Food 37 14.12 20 14.49 22 17.60 19 9.45
Garments 45 17.18 22 15.94 26 20.80 28 13.93
Other Manufacturing 89 33.97 49 35.51 50 40.00 60 29.85
Retail 18 6.87 10 7.25 5 4.00 19 9.45
Other Services 73 27.86 37 26.81 22 17.60 75 37.31
Location Tunis 53 20.23 25 18.12 18 14.40 35 17.41
Sfax 63 24.05 40 28.99 36 28.80 52 25.87
Northeast 63 24.05 36 26.09 31 24.80 46 22.89
South Coast/West 60 22.9 24 17.39 26 20.80 56 27.86
Interior 23 8.78 13 9.42 14 11.20 12 5.97
Source: Our own calculations based on the WBES.
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5.2 Empirical validation
Table 3 presents the means, the standard deviations of each variable as well as the
correlation matrix between variables used in the models. The table also provides statis-
tical tests based on each coefficient’s variance inflation factor (hereafter VIF). According
to Neter et al. (1996), the values of the individual VIF are greater than 10 and the
values of average VIF are greater than 6 indicating, hence, a multicollinearity problem.
In our context, we notice that the mean VIF is about 1.25 and the VIF of each variable
is inferior to 10. According to this result, it is proved that there is no multicollinearity
problem between the explanatory variables used in these models.
The main results of our models are given in tables 4 and 5. The results stemmed
from the ordered logit model revealing that both product and process innovations have
negative and statistically significant effects on the corruption obstacle. These results
contradict those obtained by Wong (2015) as they depict that innovation softens the
corruption obstacle. First, we argue that process innovation can be regarded as a sub-
stitute to the cost-reducing corruption. Firms do not need, then, to resort to corruption
so as to reduce their marginal production costs. Second, product innovation has a ten-
dency to be also a substitute to the rent-shifting corruption in the sense that firms can
capture additional market power by increasing their product varieties.
In line with Emerson (2006), we show that besides the variable of interest Prod-
uct/Process Innovation, the variable market competition has a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect on the perception of corruption. This means that corruption is
inversely related to product market competition. We can relate our interesting result
to the fact that WBES firms face a corruption related to rent-shifting. This contradicts
Alexeev and Song’s findings (2013). Indeed, these latter have mentioned that the rela-
tionship between competition and corruption depends on the nature of the corruption
itself. They have proved that this relationship is positive in the case of a cost-reducing
corruption but negative in the case of a rent-shifting corruption. These authors argue
that a fierce competition in the product market is generally associated with a greater
corruption critical level.
Enterprises’ external funding is very important because of the increasing financial
needs they face. For instance, the increase in the credit demand by the firm is used
to raise its investment activities and therefore its production. In this paper, we intro-
duce the variable finance in the model in order to analyze the link between obtaining
a financial credit and corruption. Indeed, the question we address in this setting is:
does having a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution reduce or increase the
corruption level? In response to this question, we show, in contradiction with Wong
(2015), that the variable finance is negatively correlated with the perceived corruption.
The intuition behind this finding is that the increase in credit demand by a firm tends
to increase its capital. Therefore, once the company increases its capital, it becomes
able to avoid the risk of corruption. Accordingly, the corruption obstacle will be dra-
matically softened.
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Table 3: Summary statistics and correlation matrix between variables
Variables VIF Mean Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Innprodt 1.25 1.742 0.437 1.000
Innproc 1.28 1.766 0.423 0.422 1.000
competition 1.33 0.516 0.500 0.020 -0.092 1.000
exports 1.46 27.218 38.633 -0.110 -0.224 0.482 1.000
finance 1.09 1.410 0.492 0.092 -0.015 0.002 0.150 1.000
agefirm 1.06 1991.668 13.906 -0.045 -0.094 0.019 0.162 0.080 1.000
size 1.27 9991369 3.20e+07 -0.103 -0.125 0.061 0.074 -0.148 -0.112 1.000
Educ enr 1.27 12.333 20.728 -0.066 -0.066 0.123 0.126 -0.169 -0.083 0.432 1.000
Mean VIF 1.25
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Another important result is related to the impact of employees’ enrollment level
on corruption. Wong (2015) demonstrated that education positively affects, with a
decreasing rate, corruption. Unlike Wong (2015) and Shabbir and Anwar (2007), we
show in this paper that the link between education enrollment level (Educ enr) and
corruption is negative. This means that the education level can reduce the incidence of
corruption. In this setting, we can notice that the education level can be an important
tool to fight corruption.
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Table 4: Impact of product innovation on corruption
Corruption obstacle
1 2 3 4
Product innovation -0.490* -0.552** -0.558** -0.494*
(-1.78) (-1.98) (-1.99) (-1.75)
Competition -0.534** -0.517** -0.442*
(-2.03) (-1.97) (-1.67)
Exports 0.00442 0.00463 0.00621
(1.10) (1.15) (1.28)
Finance -0.485** -0.503** -0.544**
(-2.12) (-2.19) (-2.24)
Age of the firm 0.00967 0.00899 0.00947
(1.11) (1.04) (1.06)
Size 3.27e-09 4.48e-09 5.35e-09
(0.64) (1.03) (1.33)
Educ enr -0.00551 -0.00729*
(-1.26) (-1.68)
Sectors
1. Food Reference
2.Garments 0.389
(0.64)
3.Other Manufacturing 0.698*
(1.74)
4.Retail 1.296**
(2.24)
5.Other Services 0.953**
(2.27)
cut1 -0.211 18.31 16.91 18.51
(-0.43) (1.05) (0.98) (1.04)
cut2 0.487 19.03 17.63 19.24
(0.97) (1.09) (1.02) (1.08)
cut3 1.451** 20.01 18.62 20.25
(2.79) (1.15) (1.08) (1.13)
cut4 2.872** 21.46 20.07 21.72
(5.25) (1.23) (1.16) (1.21)
N 536 536 536 536
Values () represent the t of student
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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Table 5: Impact of process innovation on corruption
Corruption obstacle
1 2 3 4
Process Innovation -0.963** -0.996** -1.001** -0.905**
(-3.06) (-3.03) (-3.04) (-2.73)
Competition -0.482* -0.465* -0.399
(-1.93) (-1.86) (-1.57)
Exports 0.00559 0.00580 0.00703
(1.42) (1.47) (1.41)
Finance -0.421* -0.440* -0.487**
(-1.83) (-1.90) (-1.98)
Age of the firm 0.00937 0.00864 0.00936
(1.07) (0.99) (1.04)
Size 4.67e-09 5.90e-09 6.49e-09
(0.96) (1.40) (1.62)
Educ enr -0.00561 -0.00714*
(-1.31) (-1.67)
Sectors
1. Food Reference
2.Garments 0.396
(0.63)
3.Other Manufacturing 0.664*
(1.65)
4.Retail 1.236**
(2.18)
5.Other Services 0.850**
(1.98)
cut1 0.657 18.69 17.19 19.11
(1.15) (1.06) (0.98) (1.06)
cut2 1.378** 19.43 17.92 19.86
(2.34) (1.10) (1.03) (1.10)
cut3 2.361** 20.43 18.93 20.87
(3.86) (1.16) (1.08) (1.16)
cut4 3.788** 21.88 20.38 22.35
(5.88) (1.24) (1.16) (1.24)
N 536 536 536 536
Values () represent the t of student
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001
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6 Conclusion
This paper endeavored to analyze the extent to which Tunisian firms consider cor-
ruption as a major obstacle to their operations. Among these activities, we focus on
innovation activities. In this paper, we distinguish between product innovation and pro-
cess innovation. To test our hypotheses, we rely on the World Bank Enterprise Survey
conducted in 2013. By using the ordered logit model, we show that both product and
process innovation have a negative but significant effect on the corruption obstacle. We
suggest that innovation allows firms to break up with the existing corrupted systems
through the creation of information and communication technologies (ICT) that, in
turn, induce the rise of a new anti-corruption network. Intuitively, we can relate this
result, for instance, to the fact that launching new software applications helps agents
to disclose on or ban the observed corruption behavior. In addition, the corruptors
will incur higher switching costs when they try to decrypt these ICTs and therefore
use them for their own interest. Public authorities have also a tendency to adopt these
technologies in a bid to handle the corrupted activities. Indeed, the ICT contribute to
lessening the corruption obstacle that private and public decision makers suffer from.
On the other hand, in contrast with Kaffenberger (2012), we have found a negative
relationship between educational enrollment and corruption.
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Appendix
A Definition of variables
Variable Variable Definition
name in ES
Corruption Obsta-
cle
j30f Is corruption No Obstacle (0), a Minor Obstacle (1),
a Moderate Obstacle (2), a Major Obstacle (3), or a
Very Severe Obstacle (4) to the current operations of
this establishment?
Product innovation h1 During the last three years, has this establishment in-
troduced new or significantly improved products or ser-
vices? Please exclude the simple resale of new goods
purchased from others and changes of a solely aesthetic
nature.
Process innovation h3 During the last three years, has this establishment in-
troduced any new or significantly improved methods of
manufacturing products or offering services?
Employee level of
education
MNAl9a1 At the end of fiscal year 2012, how many full-time per-
manent employees in this establishment had the follow-
ing as their highest education level? University degree
or higher/Completed Secondary school including Voca-
tional
Size d2 In fiscal year 2012, what were this establishment’s total
annual sales for ALL products and services?
Finance k8 At this time, does this establishment have a line of credit
or a loan from a financial institution?
Exports (100-d3a) In fiscal year 2012, what percent of this establishment’s
sales were national sales?
Competition e2 In fiscal year 2012, for the main market in which this
establishment sold its main product, how many com-
petitors did this establishment’s main product face?
Age of the firm b5 In what year did this establishment begin operations?
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey.
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